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Abstract ― The paper applies a non-parametric propensity score matching 
approach to evaluate the effects of two types of farm programs (agri-environment 
(AE) programs and the less favoured area (LFA) scheme) on input use and farm 
output of individual farms in Germany. The analysis reveals a positive and 
significant treatment effect of the LFA scheme for farm sales and the area under 
cultivation. Participants in AE schemes are found to significantly increase the area 
under cultivation (in particular grassland), resulting in a decrease of livestock 
densities. Furthermore, participation in AE programs significantly reduced the 
purchase of farm chemicals (fertilizer, pesticide). We also find substantial 
differences in the treatment effect between individual farms (heterogeneous 
treatment effects). Farms which can generate the largest benefit from the program 
are most likely to participate. 
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1. Introduction 
The impact of government programs on agricultural output and farm structure is a key 
policy issues in the ongoing international trade negotiations on agriculture. Fostered by 
the fact that more and more data become available on a micro (individual farm) level, 
recent years have seen a substantial growth in the number of empirical studies on the 
consequences of farm policies for individual farms (Salhofer und Streicher, 2005; Shaik 
und Helmers, 2006), as well as for different regions (Ahearn, Yee und Korb, 2005; Goetz 
und Debertin, 2001; Kim et al., 2005). This literature mainly focuses on the consequences 
of policy measures for farm exit rates, farm output and growth as well as adjustments in 
on-farm and off-farm labour markets. Despite the fact that these topics now rank high on 
the agenda of economists and policy makers, Ahearn, Yee, and Korb (2005, p. 1182) 
conclude that ‘our understanding of how government policies have affected the structure 
of agriculture, or how future policies could be designed to promote specific outcomes 
remains limited.’ 
In practice, policy interventions turn out to be difficult to evaluate. For one thing, 
government programs frequently have different (sometimes even conflicting) objectives 
which are difficult to conceptualize, and each program often uses a large set of diverse 
instruments to accommodate these goals: programs might stimulate demand for 
agricultural output (export subsidies), regulate output prices directly (price support 
programs) or influence production processes (environmental programs or land retirement 
programs). Again other programs aim at maintaining the number of family farms in a 
particular region by providing direct income transfers. 
Even when researchers aim at evaluating one specific program and/or focus on one 
specific instrument only, the evaluation of its consequences is difficult since policy 
measures not only impact individual farmers directly but also can trigger indirect effects 
through a variety of mechanisms. Key and Roberts (2006), for example, argue that farms 
receiving relatively high direct payments may be able to bid up the price of land and other 
fixed resources. Direct transfers to individual farms thus will have indirect effects on other 
farms via the adjustment of input prices. In addition, the authors sketch possible indirect 
effects of governmental payments on farm businesses through capital market mechanisms 
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if farmers’ are liquidity is constrained. Given the very complex effects and interactions, 
economic theory often provides only limited guidance with respect to the ‘correct’ 
specification of an econometric model (where all relevant variables are included and the 
functional form is adequate).1  
The dominance of family businesses is another important characteristic of the farm sector, 
which complicates the theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of farm programs. 
The unique relationship between the farm household and the farm business implies that 
decisions relating to production, consumption, as well as labour supply and leisure for all 
family members must be made simultaneously. The optimal response to a particular 
governmental program will thus not only depend on the characteristics of the individual 
farm but also on the size and structure of the farm family. We should not expect to find the 
response to farm programs to be homogenous across individual farms.  
Finally, participation in farm programs typically is voluntary. An individual farmer will 
participate only if the additional benefits exceed the costs of participation. Costs and 
benefits will differ between individuals depending on specific characteristics of the farm 
as well as the farm family, some of which, however, may not fully be observed 
(unobserved heterogeneity). The existence of systematic differences between program 
participants and non-participants requires separation of the ‘true’ effect of program 
participation (‘causal effect’) from the effect of initial differences in characteristics of the 
two groups (‘selection effect’)2. To distinguish between the two effects, an evaluator has to 
answer the following question: ‘How much did farms participating in the program benefit 
compared to what they would have experienced without participating in the program?’ The 
fact that this counterfactual situation can not be observed constitutes the ‘classical 
evaluation problem’.  
                                                 
1
  In an early attempt to rigorously evaluate the impact of farm programs in a theoretical model, Leathers 
(1992) concludes: ‘The impact of alternative agricultural programs on the structure of agriculture 
depends on certain conditions which cannot be predicted by theory alone’ (p. 298).  
2
  This problem is highlighted in Salhofer and Streicher (2005) in the case of participation in agri-
environmental programs in Austria: ‘... critics might argue that there is a large self-selection bias, i.e. 
only those farmers participate in extensification programmes which are not producing very intensively 
anyway’ (p. 9). Windfall profits (due to selection effect) reduce the efficiency of policy measures and 
lead to an overestimation of the ‘true’ effects of a particular policy.  
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The present paper applies a non-parametric propensity score matching approach to 
evaluate the effects of two types of farm programs (agri-evironmental programs and the 
less favoured area scheme) for individual farms in Germany. The matching approach is 
widely used when evaluating labour market policies (see e.g. Heckman; LaLonde und 
Smith, 1999). According to our knowledge, Lynch et al. (2007) is the only application 
evaluating agricultural policy measures. The key advantage of matching (over standard 
regression methods) is that it is less demanding with respect to the modelling assumptions. 
Specifically, matching does not require functional form assumptions for the outcome 
equation (it is non-parametric).3 Further, with matching, there is no need for the 
assumption of constant additive treatment effects across individuals. Instead, the 
individual causal effects are unrestricted and individual effect heterogeneity in the 
population is permitted. By applying a matching estimator, we thus hope to mitigate some 
of the difficulties of evaluating the consequences of farm policies mentioned above. Note, 
however, that the aim of this analysis is not to evaluate the effectiveness of a policy in 
terms of the degree to which a particular (often vaguely defined) policy objective has been 
realized. Instead, we follow previous studies and aim at assessing the effects of policy 
measures with respect to input use (land, labour, farm chemicals) and farm output (sales). 
The following Section 2 briefly describes the policy measures to be evaluated. The 
estimation method and the data used are outlined in Section 3. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results along with a number of extensions and robustness checks considering 
statistical methods and data reliability. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
                                                 
3
  Dehejia and Wahba (1999) and Smith and Todd (2005) directly compare the results of matching and 
regression estimates and show that avoiding functional form assumptions can be important to reduce 
bias. 
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2. The Agri-environmental and Less Favoured Area Program 
Total expenditures of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reached 54.6 Billion Euro in 
2006. Direct payments and price policies account for the largest share (78 %) of CAP 
expenditures. A minor but increasing part of the CAP budget (22%) is allocated to rural 
development policies (EU Commission, 2006). Agri-environment programs (AE-
programs) and the less favoured area scheme (LFA) account for 57 % of total public 
expenditures for rural development in the EU (Agrar CEAS Consulting, 2005). These 
figures illustrate that both schemes became core instruments of the rural development 
policies within the EU and are no longer of solely marginal importance within the CAP 
framework. 
AE programs and the LFA scheme are directly targeted to farm enterprises. Support for 
naturally less-favoured areas was introduced in 1975 on 30 % of total farmland in 
Germany, and expanded to 55 % of farmland in 2005. Since 2000, a similar scheme (also 
classified as a LFA program) is available in areas with environmental restrictions. It 
accounts for a small portion (< 5 %) of the LFA land area (IEEP, 2006, p. 55). Farms 
located in designated LFAs are eligible for support. The core objective of the LFA scheme 
is the maintenance of the agricultural land use within these regions (Reg. (EC) No 
1257/1999, Article 13a). The share of granted farmland on total farmland was highest in 
the southern part of Germany, followed by western and eastern states (Plankl et al., 2005). 
LFA support has little relevance in the north of Germany due to superior natural 
conditions for agricultural production. The average proportion of total farmland classified 
as LFA is 55 % in the EU-15.4 In Finland, Portugal, Luxembourg, Spain and Greece more 
than 70 % of the farmed land were classified as LFAs in 2003, while the share of LFAs is 
marginal in The Netherlands (0 %), Belgium (20 %) and Denmark (0 %) (IEEP, 2006, p. 
153). 
 
The EU’s agri-environmental programs were introduced as ‘Accompanying Measures’ of 
the 1992 Mac Sharry Reform of the CAP, since the 2000 CAP reform (EC No 1257/1999), 
                                                 
4
  A European perspective of the implementation, evolvement and effects of the LFA program is 
provided by the IEEP (2006). 
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agri-environmental programs are categorized as ‘second pillar’ policies. Farmers receive 
compensation payments for the adoption of environmentally favourable production 
technologies. Agri-environment payments are meant to cover the income foregone and 
additional costs for compliance. The incentive component may not exceed 20 % of the 
premia.  
Participation in the programs is voluntary and varies significantly between EU member 
states5 as well as between different regions within member states. While more than two 
thirds of the total agricultural area is covered by at least one AE-program in Austria, 
Finland, Sweden, and Luxemburg, the average share is around 25 % in Germany (Salhofer 
und Glebe, 2006, p. 3). Similar to the LFA scheme, participation in AE programs is very 
high in the South (70 % of total farm land), moderate in the West and East (20 %) and 
marginal in the North (5 %) of Germany. More than 100 different sub-programs6 are 
available within the framework of the AE scheme on the state level. Support for reduced 
inputs on grassland and arable land and organic farming account for the largest share of 
AE expenditures in Germany (Osterburg, 2004). 
Besides natural and environmental conditions, institutional settings play an important role 
for the regional distribution of LFA and AE-programs. Both programs are implemented on 
the national and state level with shared responsibilities with respect to finances and 
contents. Thus, the share of LFA and AE-programs does reflect the political relevance 
placed upon them, as well as the financial capability of the federal and state governments. 
                                                 
5
  Causes for spatial heterogeneity in the uptake of agri-environmental programs across Europe are 
analysed in Glebe and Salhofer (2006).  
6
  Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to distinguish among sub programs of the AE programs. 
Organic farms are identified by a specific code but are too few in numbers for a separate analysis.  
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3. Estimation method and data  
(a) Evaluation problem and matching 
Evaluation studies attempt to estimate the mean effect of participating in a program 
(treatment). This requires making an inference about the outcome that would have been 
observed for the treated (‘treatment group’) if they had not been treated (‘control group’). 
The key advantage of experimental studies (over non-experimental methods) is the ability 
to generate a control group that has the same distribution of characteristics as the 
treatment group. In this case, the treatment effect can be calculated as the difference of 
mean outcomes. In non-experimental studies on the other hand, subjects usually self-select 
into treatment groups. Treated and controls differ with respect to their participation status 
but also with respect to many other characteristics. Calculating the treatment effect as the 
difference of mean outcomes between the two groups would yield biased results (selection 
bias). 
Matching is a widely-used non-experimental method of evaluation that can be used to 
estimate the average effect of a particular program.7 This method compares the outcomes 
of program participants with those of matched non-participants, where matches are chosen 
on the basis of similarity in observed characteristics. Suppose there are two groups of 
farmers indexed by participation status P = 0/1, where 1 (0) indicates farms that did (not) 
participate in a program. Denote by 1iY  the outcome (performance of farm) conditional on 
participation (P = 1) and by 0iY  the outcome conditional on non-participation (P = 0).  
The most common evaluation parameter of interest is the mean impact of treatment on the 
treated, ( ) [ ] [ ]111 0101 =−===−= iiiiiii PYEPYEPYYEATT , which answers the 
following question: ‘How much did farms participating in the program benefit compared 
to what they would have experienced without participating in the program?’ Data on 
)1( 1 =PYE i  are available from the program participants. An evaluator’s ‘classic problem’ 
                                                 
7
  A detailed discussion of the matching approach as well as a survey on its applications in labour-market 
evaluation studies is available in Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999), Caliendo (2006) as well as 
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2007).  
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is to find )1( 0 =PYE i , since data on non-participants enables one to identify )0( 0 =PYE i  
only. So the difference between )1( 1 =PYE i  and )1( 0 =PYE i  cannot be observed for the 
same farm. 
The solution advanced by Rubin (1977) is based on the assumption that given a set of 
observable covariates X, potential (non-treatment) outcomes are independent of the 
participation status (conditional independence assumption-CIA): Xii SY ⊥0 . Hence, 
after adjusting for observable differences, the mean of the potential outcome is the same 
for P = 1 and P = 0 ( ),0(),1( 00 XX === PYEPYE ii ). This permits the use of matched 
non-participating farms to measure how the group of participating farms would have 
performed, had they not participated.  
This procedure assumes that after conditioning on a set of observable characteristics, 
outcomes are conditionally mean independent of program participation. Heckman, 
Ichimura and Todd (1997) stress that, for a variety of reasons, there may be systematic 
differences between participant and non-participant outcomes, even after conditioning on 
observables. Such differences may occur, for example, because of program selectivity on 
unmeasured characteristics or because of level differences in outcomes 
( ))1(( 01 =− iii PYYE  that might arise when participants and non-participants reside in 
different regions. To improve the results of the matching procedure, the authors suggest a 
conditional difference-in-difference matching estimator (d-i-d). Let t represent a time 
period after the program start date and t’ a time period before the program. The 
conditional d-i-d estimator compares the conditional before-after outcomes of program 
participants with those of non-participants: ( ) ( )XX ,0,1 0'00'1 =−−=− iititiitit PYYEPYYE . 
The d-i-d is attractive because, unlike conventional matching estimators, it permits 
selection to be based on potential program outcomes at time t’ and allows for selection on 
unobservables.8  
                                                 
8
  In their analysis of the effectiveness of matching estimators, Smith and Todd (2005) found difference-
in-difference matching estimators to perform much better than cross-sectional methods in cases where 
participants and non-participants were drawn from different regional labour markets. Since program 
participation differs significantly between regions in the present context as well, the d-i-d estimator 
will be used. 
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Instead of conditioning on X, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest conditioning on a 
propensity score (‘propensity score matching’). The propensity score is defined as the 
probability of participation for farm i given a set ixX =  of farm characteristics 
( ) ( )ixXX ==≡ 1Pr iPp . In the present context with multiple treatments (AE programs and 
LFA scheme), the propensity scores are derived from two logit models where participation in 
the AE and LFA program serve as endogenous variables. The estimated propensity scores are 
then used to construct the comparison groups. A Greedy algorithm employing nearest 
available pair matching without replacement will be applied (Parson, 2001). Compared to 
other matching algorithms, the Greedy algorithm performs well in the sense of producing 
balanced matched samples (Gu und Rosenbaum, 1993, p. 405 ).9  
(b) Data and definition of variables 
The empirical analysis is based on a panel data set (‘LAND-Data’) of more than 32,000 
bookkeeping farms in Germany for the period 2000 to 200510. ‘LAND-Data’ provides 
information on farm characteristics (area under cultivation, sales, labour inputs, capital 
endowment and expenditures for farm chemicals ...) and also includes information on the 
participation in the AE and LFA program. From these 32,000 farms in the original data 
set, roughly one third had to be eliminated due to incomplete and missing data. To 
evaluate the effect of programme participation with the conditional d-i-d estimator, we 
focus only on those farms, that did not participate in the program in the initial time period 
(2000). The selection of data and the definition of the participation variables is described 
in Table 1 (for additional information on variable definition and data source see Table A1 
in the appendix). 
Table 1 
Sample Selection Criteria and Program Participation 
                                                 
9
  The different propensity score matching schemes used in the empirical literature are discussed in more 
detail in Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997), Smith and Todd (2005) as well as Becker and Ichino 
(2002). Since there is no consensus on the best matching estimator to adopt, we compare the outcomes 
with those from alternative estimators to assess the stability of our results.  
10
  The sample comprises 8 % of all farm enterprises in Germany. Note that the sample is not 
representative for Germany as large-scale and full-time farm enterprises are over represented. 
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 AE 
programs 
LFA 
scheme 
Total number of farms with continuous records from 2000 to 2005 32,503 
Omitted due to missing observations for some variables 10,390 8,594 
Number of remaining farms 22,113 23,909 
Program Participation in base year (2000) 557 9,695 
Non-participation in base year (2000)  21,556 14,214 
Continuous program participation (2001 – 2005): 
 
Dummy variable (PAE) is set equal to 1 for farms which 
continually participate in the Agri-environmental program 
from 2001 until 2005 (for five years) 
 
Dummy variable (PLFA) is set equal to 1 for farms which 
continually participate in the Less Favoured Area scheme 
starting from 2001, 2002 or 2003 until 2005 (at least for three 
years) 
 
 
9,138 
 
 
 
 
 
 
502 
Program participation in some years only (these observations will not 
be used for the empirical analysis):  
 
Number of farms participating in the Agri-environmental program 
for some years only (less than five years) 
 
Number of farms participating in the Less Favoured Area scheme 
for few years only (less than three years) 
 
 
 
5,223 
 
 
 
 
 
 
637 
Non-participation (2001 – 2005):  
 
Dummy variable (PAE) is set equal to 0 for farms which never 
participated in the Agri-environmental program between 2001 
and 2005 
 
Dummy variable (PLFA) is set equal to 0 for farms which never 
participated in the Less Favoured Area scheme between 2001 
and 2005  
 
 
7,195 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13,075 
The basis for the empirical analysis (propensity score difference-in-difference matching 
estimator) of AE programs are those 21,556 farms that did not participate in AE programs 
in the base year 2000. From those farms, 9,138 farms (42.4 %) continually participate in 
AE programs during the following five year period from 2001 until 2005 (the dummy 
variable PAE is set equal to one). The dummy variable is set equal to zero for the 7,195 
farms (33.4 %) which never participate in AE programs between 2001 and 2005. Note that 
5,223 farms (24.2 %) participate in some years only. These farms will not be used for the 
empirical analysis.  
A dummy variable for program participation in the ‘less favoured area program’ (LFA) is 
defined in a similar way. In the initial period 2000, 14,214 farms did not participate in the 
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LFA program. Note that in the case of the LFA program, the number of farms continually 
participating in the program in all five years (from 2001 until 2005) and not participating 
in the base year 2000 is very small (only 109 farms). Since this number is too small to 
carry out a matching analysis, we have chosen a less restrictive classification criterion in 
this case. A dummy variable (PLFA) is set equal to one for those farms (502 or 3.5 %) 
which participate in the program from 2001, 2002 or 2003 until 2005 (for at least for three 
years). The majority of farms (13,075 or 92.0 %) never participate in the LFA scheme. The 
dummy variable PLFA is set equal to zero in this case. The remaining 637 farms, which 
participate in a few years only are eliminated from the empirical analysis. Given that the 
selection into the treatment group is less restrictive for the LFA scheme, we expect to find 
a weaker causal effect of this program. Whether program participation (PAE = 1 or PLFA = 
1) has significant effects on farm performance rates will be evaluated in the following 
section.  
4. Empirical results 
(a) Propensity Scores and Matching 
Conditional probabilities for participation in AE and LFA programs are computed by 
estimating two logit models. Table A2 in the appendix reports the parameter estimates for 
both models, the results are only briefly discussed here. The estimated models are 
statistically significant at the 1 % level or better, as measured by the likelihood ratio test. 
The empirical model for the AE-program (the LFA scheme) correctly classifies 87.79 % 
(96,61 %) of all observations. From the parameter estimates of the logit models, the 
unbounded propensity scores are calculated for every farm which are then used for the 
matching analysis.11 
Matching is considered successful when significant differences of covariates among 
participants and non-participants are removed. Table 2 reports unadjusted and adjusted 
                                                 
11
  We use the unbounded βˆ'ix  rather than the bounded propensity score ( )βˆ'ixΦ  because of its preferable 
distribution properties (Hujer; Mauerer und Wellner, 1997). 
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mean differences of covariates among participants and non-participants of AE and LFA 
programs for the pre-treatment status (2000).12 
 
Table 2 
Mean comparison of selected variables (Frequencies for Dummy Variables) in the pre-treatment year 2000 
 Agri-Environmental Programs Less Favoured Area Program 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable 
Selected 
Treatments
Potential 
Controls 
Selected 
Controls 
Selected 
Treatments 
Potential 
Controls 
Selected 
Controls
Ln farm sales 4.781 4.783 4.776 4.742 4.807 4.783
Ln on-farm labour 0.365 0.307 0.363 0.427 0.326 0.464
Ln off-farm labour 1.080 1.118 1,083 0.723 1.159 0.740
Ln area under cultivation 4.053 3.932 4.039 3.955 3.941 3.971
Ln share of grassland 3.066 2.920 3.047 2.850 2.304 2.783
Ln share of rented land 3.792 3.698 3.798 3.745 3.712 3.749
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.728 0.850 0.737 0.787 0.866 0.812
Farm income 20.159 18.466 18.554 21.140 18.836 19.950
Ln farm capital (per ha)  2.301 2.349 2.319 2.521 2.414 2.493
Ln cattle livestock units 3.247 3.135 3.227 2.995 2.553 2.926
Ln cattle livestock density 0.489 0,545 0.494 0.511 0.474 0.501
Ln fertilizer expend. (per ha) -2.522 -2.443 -2.532 -2.925 -2.409 -2.641
Ln pesticide expend. (per ha) -2.970 -2.952 -2.992 -2.640 -2.617 -2.871
Dummy North 593 2,970 541 6 4,865 5
Dummy West 711 3,545 751 108 4,313 108
Dummy South 451 581 463 334 3,718 337
Dummy East  52 95 52 4 179 2
Number of observations 1,807 7,195 1,807 452 13,075 452
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Bold numbers indicate significantly different 
means between observation from the potential (selected) treatment group and from the potential (selected) 
control group in a t-test for equality of means at the 5 % level. 
 
Prior to the matching analysis, farms participating in AE and/or LFA programs 
significantly differ from non-participants with respect to nearly all characteristics shown 
in Table 2. A comparison between column (1) and (2) indicates that farms enrolled in AE 
programs are characterized by a larger area under cultivation and higher farm incomes, for 
example. These differences in farm characteristics between program participants and non-
                                                 
12
  The percentage reduction of the selection bias are reported in Table A3 and A4 in the appendix. The 
graphical distribution of propensity scores p(X) of potential treatment and controls are displayed in 
Figure A1. 
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participants are significantly different from zero. Table 2 also reports significant 
differences between treatments and potential controls in the case of participation in the 
LFA program (compare column (4) and (5)). 
Columns (3) and (6) report the means of the relevant variables for the control group after 
the matching procedure has been applied. From the 9,138 (502) farms with participation in 
AE (LFA) programs, 1,807 (452) were matched to farms with no participation but similar 
propensity scores. The differences to columns (1) and (4) are now much smaller and in no 
case significantly different from zero at the 5 % level. We can thus conclude that all 
differences in means between treatments and controls have been removed through 
matching in the initial period 2000 (before program participation).  
(b) Treatment Effects 
The average effect of the participation in AE and LFA programs is estimated by 
comparing the changes in individual outcomes (farm characteristics) between participants 
( 12000,
1
2005,
1
iii YYY −=Δ ) and their matched counterparts ( 02000,02005,0 iii YYY −=Δ ) between 2000 
and 2005 (d-i-d analysis).  The impact of treatment on the treated (‘causal effect’ of 
program participation) is estimated by computing mean differences across both groups:  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ−Δ= ∑∑
==
11
1
0
1
1
1
1 N
i
i
N
i
i YYN
ATT . 
A positive (negative) value of ATT suggests, that farms with participation in AE and/or 
LFA programs have higher (lower) growth rates of variable Y than non-participants. Table 
3 displays mean growth rates for the treatment and control group as well as the difference 
between both (the ATT). 
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Table 3 
Average treatment effect (ATT) of the treated for the AE and LFA programs (2000 to 2005) 
 Treatments Controls ATT t-value 
 [1] [2] = [1] - [2] (Significance) 
Agri-Environmental Programs      
Ln farm sales 0.073 0.048 0.025 1.72 (*) 
Ln on-farm labour 0.007 -0.012 0.019 1.95 (*) 
Ln off-farm labour -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.55  
Ln area under cultivation 0.077 0.042 0.035 5.32 (***) 
Ln share of grassland -0.046 -0.098 0.052 3.13 (***) 
Ln share of rented land 0.004 -0.018 0.022 1.52  
Ln cattle livestock units -0.187 -0.187 0.001 0.03  
Ln cattle livestock density -0.108 -0.048 -0.060 -3.30 (***) 
Ln farm sales (per ha) -0.004 0.006 -0.010 -0.70  
Ln farm capital (per ha) 0.035 0.047 -0.012 -0.79  
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 0.037 0.131 -0.094 -4.57 (***) 
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) -0.025 0.022 -0.047 -1.97 (**) 
      
Less Favoured Area Program      
Ln farm sales 0.144 0.056 0.088 2.96 (***) 
Ln on-farm labour 0.001 -0.012 0.013 0.83  
Ln off-farm labour -0.008 0.000 -0.008 -1.11  
Ln area under cultivation 0.114 0.060 0.054 3.64 (**) 
Ln share of grassland -0.041 -0.048 0.007 0.28  
Ln share of rented land 0.043 0.011 0.032 1.06  
Ln cattle livestock units -0.102 -0.147 0.046 1.09  
Ln cattle livestock density -0.095 -0.088 -0.007 -0.26  
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.030 -0.004 0.034 1.17  
Ln farm capital (per ha)  0.000 -0.011 0.011 0.34  
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 0.132 0.169 -0.037 -0.91  
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) -0.012 0.037 -0.049 -0.92  
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-
test for equality of means at 1 % (***), 5 % (**), or 10 % (*) level. 
 
The d-i-d estimator suggests a significant and positive causal impact of program 
participation on farm sales. During the period of investigation (from 2000 until 2005) sales 
of farms participating in AE programs have been growing by 7.3 %, while non-participants 
report a positive growth rate in sales of 4.8 % on average. The difference (ATT = 2.5 %) is 
different from zero at the 10 % level of significance. The slight positive effect of AE 
programs on farm sales is surprising insofar as participation in this program requires the 
adoption of less intensive production methods which could be expected to reduce farm 
output and thus farm sales, ceteris paribus. No such adjustment in production methods is 
required for participation in the LFA program. Consistently, we observe that the causal 
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effect of program participation in the LFA program is much stronger. Sales of non-
participants have been growing by 5.6 % on average during the period from 2000 until 
2005. Participation in the LFA program caused the growth rate of sales to increase by 
more than twice this rate. The growth rate of participating farms is 14.4 % on average, the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT = 8.8 %) is significantly different from zero 
at the 1 % level. Where does this significant increase in farm sales come from? 
Existing empirical studies found significant effects of government payments on farm 
labour. Mishra and Goodwin (1997), Weiß (2006) and Hofer (2002) provide empirical 
evidence for a negative effect of government payments on off-farm labour supply and a 
positive effect of the farm hours worked. ‘[L]arger receipts of government farm 
programme payments were significantly correlated with less off-farm work by farmers and 
their spouse’(Mishra und Goodwin, 1997, p. 886). Ahearn et. al (2006) and Serra et. al 
(2005) point out that both coupled and decoupled payments negatively affect off-farm 
employment. However, Ahearn, Yee and Korb (2005, p. 1187) suggest that the negative 
effects of conservation payments – such as AE and LFA schemes - on off-farm 
employment are considerably smaller than those of commodity payments. The results 
reported in Table 3 reject the idea that the additional growth in farm sales is significantly 
related to adjustments in farm labour. On-farm labour increases only moderately as a 
consequence of participation in AE programs (ATT = 1.9 %), no significant effect is 
reported with respect to off-farm labour. The average treatment effect of the LFA program 
with respect to on-farm (off-farm) labour is marginal (0.13 % and -0.8 % respectively) and 
not significantly different from zero. Changes in labour allocation can not explain 
observable changes in farm sales.  
A significant increase in farm sales is paralleled by an increase in the area under 
cultivation. These results comply with findings of Key et al. (2005, p. 1217f), Osterburg 
(2004) and Reiter et al. (2003). Average growth rates of the area under cultivation differ 
significantly among program participants and non-participants. On average, participation 
in AE programs causes farm growth rates to double. Whereas the area under cultivation 
for non-participants has been growing by 4.2 %, participants report a growth rate of 7.7 % 
on average. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of 3.5 % is significantly 
different from zero at the 1 % level.  
 15
Higher farm land growth rates of participants in AE programs can be explained by the 
adjustment process of farms induced by program eligibility criteria. Farms with 
participation to certain AE programs (low input grassland management, for example) are, 
among others, required not to exceed a certain cattle livestock density (livestock units per 
forage area). In order to meet this criteria, farm operators predominantly choose to expand 
the forage area, while total cattle livestock units per farm are kept stable. Results in Table 
3 illustrate this adjustment process. The number of livestock units is not affected by 
programme participation (ATT = 0 %). The cattle livestock density is, on average, reduced 
by 10.8 % in farms with program participation compared to a decrease of 4.8 % in farms 
with non-participation. The ATT with respect to the cattle livestock density is –6 % and 
significantly different from zero at the 1 % level.  
The causal effect of the LFA scheme on farm land growth is of similar magnitude as for 
the AE programs. Scheme participation increases growth in the area under cultivation 
from 6.0 % to 11.4 % (ATT = 5.4 %). No significant causal effect is observed with respect 
to the amount of cattle livestock units or density. For the LFA scheme, the changes in farm 
land are very similar in magnitude to the figures reported for farm sales. Given the fact 
that LFA payments are granted on a per-acreage base, the increase of farmed land eligible 
for LFA payments seems to be a reasonable strategy to maximize benefits from 
participation. 
An important objective of agri-environmental policy in Germany is the maintenance of 
grassland. Land eligible for AE support is mainly grassland, whereas both, arable land and 
grassland are eligible for LFA support. Neither AE nor LFA support resulted in an 
increase of the share of grassland in farms with program participation. We find that the 
share of grassland decreases significantly less in farms participating in AE programs (-
4.6 %) than in those with non-participation (-9.8 %). The ATT of 5.2 % is significantly 
different from zero. The effect of the LFA program on the share of grassland is almost 
zero. We conclude that current AE programs slow down the decrease of grassland while 
they are not able to stop or reverse this process. 
The results reported in Table 3 further suggest that farm growth is only partly achieved by 
renting additional land. With respect to the growth of the share of rented land the ATT is 
not significantly different from zero for either program. This seems to suggest that farm 
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adjustments with respect to land input are not only temporary effects (for the time of 
program participation) but might extend to the post-program period. 
Table 3 does not suggest a significant treatment effect of AE programs on productivity 
(sales per hectare), the causal effect of the LFA program is positive but not significantly 
different from zero. This result corresponds to Salhofer and Streicher (2005) who also 
observe an insignificant productivity effect of participation for ten different farm programs 
in Austria. The same holds for the capital endowment on farms with program participation, 
which does not change significantly compared to the control group.  
Participants in the AE program are required to reduce or abandon the use fertilizers and 
pesticides, while no such eligibility criteria are in place for the LFA scheme. 
Consequently, the causal effect of program participation with respect to expenditures for 
fertilizer and pesticides per hectare differ remarkably between the two programs. The 
amount of expenditures for fertilizers (pesticides) per hectare changes in farms with 
participation in AE programs by 3.7 % (-2.5 %). At the same time, expenditures for 
fertilizers (pesticides) in the control group increase by 13.1 % (2.2 %). The ATT of -9.4 % 
(fertilizers) and -4.7 % (pesticides) indicate that farms participating in AE significantly 
reduced the purchase of farm chemicals compared to the control group. The ATT is 
significantly different from zero at the one percent (fertilizers) and five percent 
(pesticides) levels. No significant treatment effect is observed for the LFA program with 
respect to expenditures for farm chemicals. 
 
(c) Heterogeneity of Effects and Robustness of Results 
The response to a specific policy will differ between individual observations 
(heterogeneity of treatment effects) for various reasons. First, it is plausible to expect that 
the treatment effect increases with the probability of participation in the project; that is, 
farmers who can generate the largest benefit from the program are most likely to 
participate. Second, the magnitude of the treatment effect might be influenced by the 
amount of program payments per hectare, by farm size and the duration of program 
participation. 
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To check these hypotheses, we follow and extend the approach suggested in Lechner 
(2002).13 The expectation of the outcome variable conditional on the conditional selection 
probability (p(X)) in the pool of participants and non-participants is shown in Figure 1. 
The comparison is based on kernel-smoothed regressions for program participants in AE 
programs (solid line) versus non-participants (dotted line) for those outcome variables, 
where Table 3 suggested a significant ATT. The results for all other outcome variables as 
well as for participation in the LFA scheme are reported in an appendix. 
Figure 1 clearly supports the idea of heterogeneous treatment effects. The causal effect of 
the farm program, which is the difference between the two curves at any point, fluctuates 
over the support of participation probabilities. The outcomes for the program participants 
(solid line) are higher for farm sales, on-farm labour, area under cultivation, share of 
grassland; and lower for cattle livestock density, expenditures for fertilizer and pesticides 
at (almost) all points, which is consistent with the significant average treatment effect of 
AE programs for these variables reported in Table 3.14 
                                                 
13
  Splitting the sample along some characteristics and performing a disaggregate analysis is another 
possibility to find more subgroup heterogeneity of the effects. Due to the smaller number of 
observations which would result from this procedure, this route is not followed any further in this 
paper. 
14
  The treatment effect reported in Table 3 is a weighted average of the differences of these regression 
lines, with weights determined by the distribution of the respective participant.  
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Figure 1 
Nonparametric regression of the conditional participation probabilities (p(X)) 
on the outcome variable for the AEP 
 
 
 
Remarks: Nadaraya-Watson estimate using a Gaussian kernel and the rule-of-thumb bandwidth. The 
solid (dotted) line represents the outcome variable for participants (non-participants) in AE 
programs.  
The causal effect of program participation on farm sales, fertilizer expenditures and the 
share of grassland increases with the conditional participation probability (p(X)). Figure 1 
does not suggest a clear relationship between the individual treatment effect (difference 
between the two lines) and the conditional probability of participation in AE programs for 
changes in on-farm labour, area under cultivation, cattle livestock density and pesticide 
expenditures. Heterogeneous treatment effects are also evident for the LFA program. The 
results (reported in Figure A3 in the appendix) suggest a positive relationship between the 
probability of program participation and the effects on farm sales and the area under 
cultivation.  
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Further sources of heterogeneous treatment effects can be observed with respect to the 
amount of program payments per hectare. Figures A4 and A5 in the appendix suggest 
substantial fluctuations of the causal effects over the support of transfers from AE and 
LFA programs. However, no clear increasing or decreasing pattern can be observed for 
most variables. Similarly, no clear relationship between the causal effect and farm size (as 
measured by the area under cultivation) is observed in Figures A6 and A7.  
To assess the robustness of our results, we carried out a number of additional estimation 
experiments with different matching estimators. In some of these experiments the 
differences of covariates among participants and non-participants can not be removed. In 
these cases, the treatment effect is not computed as it would be biased by unobserved 
heterogeneity. When matching successfully removes differences between the two groups, 
we conclude that by and large our results remain unchanged. The results are reported in 
Tables A5 – A10 in the appendix.  
Finally, it is interesting to compare the results from propensity-score matching with those 
from a naive estimator (without controlling for differences in pre-treatment 
characteristics). A comparison of the ATT reported in Table 3 and the results from a naive 
estimator (reported in Table A11) reveals the existence of substantial selection effects. 
The calculated effect of AE programs on farm sales (the area under cultivation) is 
overestimated by the naive model by a factor of 2.2 (1.2). Distinguishing between a 
‘selection effect’ and a ‘causal effect’ is key for an appropriate evaluation of farm 
programs. 
5. Conclusions and extensions 
Evaluating the effects of farm programs on farm output is a key policy issues since this 
determines whether programs are condemned as trade distorting or can be classified as 
‘decoupled’ and conform with WTO regulations. An empirical evaluation of the effects of 
farm programs, however, faces a number of challenges: First, economic theory often 
provides limited guidance with respect to the appropriate specification of an econometric 
model. Second, farms self-select into program participation and participants and non-
participants thus differ significantly in important characteristics (selection bias). Third, 
factors that determine the selection into the program and/or influence outcome variables 
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may not fully be observed (unobserved heterogeneity). Further it remains unknown how 
participants would have performed if they had not participated in the program, as 
counterfactuals cannot be observed in non-experimental studies. Finally, the optimal 
response to governmental programs will not be homogenous across individual farms 
(heterogeneity in response). 
The present paper addresses these issues by applying a non-parametric propensity score 
matching approach (difference-in-difference estimator). Specifically, we investigate the 
effects of two farm programs – agri-environment (AE) programs and the less favoured 
area (LFA) scheme – with respect to farm size (area under cultivation), farm output 
(sales), labour supply (on- and off-farm), productivity (sales per hectare), purchase of farm 
chemicals (pesticides, fertilizers) and livestock densities in Germany for the period 2000 
to 2005.  
The analysis reveals a positive and significant treatment effect of the LFA programs on 
farm sales. Growth rates in farm sales are significantly higher (on average) for farms 
participating in the LFA program compared to non-participants. Changes in labour 
allocation can not explain this effect. The increase in farm sales observed is paralleled by 
an increase in the area under cultivation. Since LFA payments are granted on a per-
acreage basis, an increase in land eligible for support seems to be a reasonable strategy to 
maximize benefits from participation. 
We also observe a significant positive effect of the AE program on the area under 
cultivation. The increase in farm size can be explained by the need to reduce livestock 
densities (livestock units per forage area) in order to become eligible for AE payments. 
Stocking densities are predominantly reduced by renting in new land. Compared to non-
participation, AE participants reduce expenditures for farm chemicals (fertilizer, 
chemicals). The share of grassland per farm continues to decrease in farms with 
participation in AE programs, although at a lower rate than in farms with non-
participation. No significant effect on farm productivity (sales per ha), capital endowment 
per ha, off-farm labour, total cattle livestock units (per farm) can be found for AE or LFA 
programs.  
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The propensity score matching analysis reveals substantial differences in the treatment 
effects between individual farms (heterogeneous treatment effects). Farmers who can 
generate the largest benefit from the program (in terms of additional sales, for example) 
are most likely to participate. Other sources of heterogeneous treatment effects are found 
to be the duration of program participation and, to a smaller extent, the amount of program 
payments per hectare. Heterogenous treatment effects have not yet been addressed in 
greater detail in empirical evaluation studies. This remains an important area to be 
explored in future research. It would be interesting to see whether the response to farm 
programs is the same for full-time and part-time farms, for example. Similarly, the 
evaluation and comparison of the effects of farm programs in various regions (within 
Germany but also between different EU member states) could improve our knowledge 
about the farmers’ response to specific farm policies. The matching estimator applied in 
the present paper turns out to be a useful technique for the empirical evaluation of farm 
programs, the results obtained can provide an important contribution to the analysis of 
policy implications and the design of policies to promote desired outcomes. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: 
Variable definition and data sources 
 
Variables Unit Year Source 
Participation in AE programs  0=no, 1=yes 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
Participation in the LFA scheme 0=no, 1=yes 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
    
Farm characteristics    
Area under cultivation ha 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
Farm sales 1000 Euro 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
Share of grassland % 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
Share of rented land % 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
On-farm labour units 
(1 LU = 2720 working hours per year) 
LU 2000-2005 
LAND-Data 
Off-farm labour (farmer couple) LU 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
Farm capital (per ha) 1000 Euro 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
Fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 1000 Euro 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
Pesticide expenditures (per ha) 1000 Euro 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
Commodity payments, livestock (per ha) 1000 Euro 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
Commodity payments, arable (per ha)  1000 Euro 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
AE payments (per ha) Euro 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
LFA payments (per ha) Euro 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
Livestock units (all livestock) 
(1 LSU = 1 milk cow) 
LSU 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
Cattle livestock units  LSU 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
Cattle livestock density (LSU per ha grassland, fodder crops) LSU   
Livestock farm 0=no, 1=yes 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
Pig & poultry farm 0=no, 1=yes 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
Soil index (< 30 = very poor, 100 = best) Index 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
    
Regional characteristics    
Unemployment rate % 2000-2005 ZAV (2005) 
Farmland rent (per ha) Euro 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
Land price (per sqm) Euro Ø 2000-2002 BBR (2004) 
Share of rural population % 2001 BBR (2004) 
Share of farms ≤ 20 ha % 1999 STAT (2005) 
Share of farms ≥ 20 < 50 ha % 1999 STAT (2005) 
Change in the number of farms ≥ 20 < 50 ha 
(between 1999 and 2003) 
% 1999, 2003 STAT (2005) 
Gross value added in agriculture 1000 Euro 2000-2004 STAT (2005) 
Share of gross value added in agriculture 1000 Euro 2000-2004 STAT (2005) 
Gross domestic product (per capita) 1000 Euro 2000-2004 STAT (2005) 
Share of livestock farms % 1999 STAT (2005) 
Share of arable farms % 1999 STAT (2005) 
Share of pig & poultry farms % 1999 STAT (2005) 
Share of mixed farms % 1999 STAT (2005) 
Dummy North 0=no, 1=yes 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
Dummy West 0=no, 1=yes 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
Dummy South 0=no, 1=yes 2000-2005 LAND-Data 
Abbreviations: AE = Agri-Environmental Programs, LFA = Less Favoured Areas Program, ha = hectare, sqm 
= square meter, LU = Labour units, LSU = Livestock units 
Notes: ‘Regional characteristics’ refer to the characteristics of the 440 administrative districts of Germany. 
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Table A2: 
Parameter estimates of logit-models explaining program participation 
 Agri-Environmental Programs Less Favoured Area Program 
Variables Estimate Wald Chi2 (Sign.) Estimate Wald Chi2 (Sign.) 
       
Intercept (PAE=1, PLFA=1) -2.176 2.094  -3.677 6.438 (**) 
       
Farm characteristics    
Ln area under cultivation 1.367 4.987 (**) 1.007 54.441 (***) 
Ln area under cultivation (sq.) -0.041 0.336    
Ln share of grassland 0.367 82.946 (***) 0.306 17.668 (***) 
Ln share of rented land 0.105 9.443 (***) -0.064 1.288  
Ln farm sales (per ha) -0.058 0.959    
Ln off-farm labour  -0.072 8.114 (***) 
Ln farm capital (per ha) -0.046 0.910    
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) -0.419 73.219 (***) -0.312 10.496 (***) 
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha)  -0.315 19.673 (***) 
Commodity payments, livestock (per ha)  1.247 5.394 (**) 0.010 12.543 (***) 
Commodity payments, arable (per ha)  0.821 5.814 (**)   
Ln livestock units (per 100 ha) 0.000 4.906 (**) 0.169 13.493 (***) 
Ln cattle livestock units -0.106 7.526 (***) -0.223 20.031 (***) 
Ln cattle livestock density -0.118 2.075    
Cattle livestock units ≥ 0.3 <1.4 0.566 43.543 (***)   
Livestock farm -0.206 8.548 (***)   
Pig & poultry farm -0.312 7.039 (***)   
Participation in the LFA scheme 0.118 2.255    
Soil index -0.011 18.705 (***) -0.074 136.287 (***) 
    
Regional characteristics    
Unemployment rate 0.042 8.750 (***)   
Ln farmland rent (per ha) -0.954 69.433 (***) -1.097 27.942 (***) 
Land price (per sqm) -0.004 106.379 (***) -0.003 13.724 (***) 
Share of rural population -0.018 145.188 (***)   
Share of farms ≤ 20 ha 0.003 0.670    
Share of farms ≥ 20 < 50 ha 0.041 32.767 (***)   
Change in the number of farms ≥ 20 < 50 ha -0.062 20.546 (***) -0.083 4.504 (**) 
Gross value added in agriculture 0.002 10.430 (***)   
Share of gross value added in agriculture  0.120 8.471 (***) 
Gross domestic product (per capita) 0.010 17.084 (***) 0.013 35.207 (***) 
Share of livestock farms -0.022 105.809 (***)  
Share of arable farms  -0.024 28.685 (***) 
Share of pig & poultry farms  -0.160 117.619 (***) 
Share of mixed farms 0.047 22.385 (***) 0.297 129.552 (***) 
Dummy North -1.885 22.447 (***)   
Dummy West -1.151 4.281 (**)   
Dummy South 1.326 5.303 (**)   
    
Interaction    
Ln area under cultivation*Dummy North 0.073 0.686  -3.209 17.032 (***) 
Ln area under cultivation*Dummy West -0.153 1.497  2.918 19.839 (***) 
Ln area under cultivation*Dummy South 0.654 21.170 (***) 3.484 27.243 (***) 
   
Number of observations 16,333   13,577
LR chi-squared 12,288.91 (***)  1,606.55 (***) 
Pseudo R2 rescaled 0.71   0.41
   
% Correct predictions 87.79   96.61
Non-Participants 90.81   99.54
Participants 85.41   20.32
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviation see Table A1. Asteriks denote statistical significance at 1 % 
(***), 5 % (**), or 10 % (*) level.  
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Table A3: 
Test Statistics for variables explaining program participation: 
Standardized Bias (SB) in unmatched and matched subsamples 
 Agri-environmental Programs Less Favoured Area Program 
       
Variables 
SB 
unmatched
SB 
matched 
SB 
reduced % 
SB 
unmatched 
SB 
matched 
SB 
reduced % 
       
Farm characteristics   
Ln area under cultivation -15.305 2.359 116.80 -12.020 -2.768 76.44
Ln area under cultivation (sq.) -14.347 2.615 120.17    
Ln share of grassland -11.604 1.555 112.87 -21.908 4.686 122.82
Ln share of rented land -18.899 -0.525 97.17 -15.772 -0.393 97.09
Ln farm sales (per ha) 29.767 -1.334 104.78    
Ln off-farm labour -12.026 -0.774 93.81
Ln farm capital (per ha) -7.726 -2.193 69.16   
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha)  36.134 1.623 95.54 -8.760 0.133 101.57
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha)  10.820 -4.766 144.11
Commodity payments, livestock (per ha)  16.993 0.269 98.330   
Commodity payments, arable (per ha)  -6.480 1.064 116.63 -2.939 -2.569 12.00
Ln livestock units (per 100 ha) 31.121 -1.700 107.50 5.216 -0.010 100.20
Ln cattle livestock units -5.830 1.148 120.10 -21.683 3.705 118.62
Ln cattle livestock density 8.573 -0.797 110.25   
Cattle livestock units ≥ 0.3 <1.4 -16.452 5.549 137.04   
Livestock farm -5.762 -1.998 65.36   
Pig & poultry farm 12.015 -2.318 117.86   
Participation in the LFA scheme -23.508 -2.012 90.75   
Soil index 14.459 1.035 93.01 75.590 -6.926 109.53
   
Regional characteristics   
Unemployment rate 86.638 1.126 98.38   
Ln farmland rent (per ha) 42.374 -3.233 108.22 33.629 0.538 98.45
Land price (per sqm) -41.411 2.518 108.06 30.205 -2.478 109.36
Share of rural population -28.874 -1.599 94.41 -23.209 4.063 117.55
Share of farms ≤ 20 ha -71.648 1.655 102.60   
Share of farms ≥ 20 < 50 ha -23.508 -2.012 90.75   
Change of numbers of farms ≥ 20 < 50 -9.057 0.905 111.33 23.510 3.245 87.43
Gross value added in agriculture 44.334 0.553 98.69   
Share of gross value added in agriculture -7.632 3.080 140.27
Gross domestic product (per capita) -24.630 -0.047 99.87 11.577 -5.583 138.85
Share of livestock farms -5.195 -1.303 74.70   
Share of arable farms 1.909 -2.842 244.83
Share of pig & poultry farms 4.028 3.273 17.49
Share of mixed farms -24.194 -2.189 91.31 -15.790 0.903 105.84
Dummy North 92.006 6.203 91.62 -1.900 2.018 202.74
Dummy West 100.984 -4.510 105.54 3.382 0.000 100.00
Dummy South -225.915 -1.527 99.10 1.110 -1.516 233.83
   
Mean  -4.322 -0.023 101.72 2.606 -0.395 116.95
Median -6.480 -0.047 99.87 -0.226 -0.005 107.60
Notes: For variable definition see Table A1. The standardized bias (SB) is defined as the difference of the 
means in the respective sub-samples divided by the square root of the average standard deviation of 
covariates of treated and controls * 100. SB can be interpreted as the bias in percent of the average standard 
deviation (see Baser, 2006). The standardized bias is calculated for those variables only, which were used as 
explanatory variables in the logit analysis (see Table A2). 
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Table A4: 
Descriptive Statistics and test results for propensity score before and after matching 
 Agri-environmental programs Less Favoured Area Program 
 Mean Std. Dev. t-value 
(Significance) 
Mean Std. Dev. t-value 
(Significance) 
Potential treatments 0.833 0.266  0.2807 0.259   
Potential controls 0.212 0.203 168.93 (***) 0.0276 0.0673 21.87 (***) 
Selected treatments  0.391 0.285  0.2257 0.2039   
Selected controls 0.391 0.285 0.00 0.2243 0.2034 0.10  
Notes: Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1 % (***). The t-value is calculated from a test of 
differences in means between line 1 and 2 as well as 3 and 4 respectively. 
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Table A5(a): 
Results from 1:1 Matching with replacement (common support, 5 % trimming) 
 
(a) Mean comparison of selected variables in year 2000 
 Agri-Environmental Programs Less Favoured Area Program 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables 
 
Selected 
Treatments
Potential 
Controls 
Selected 
Controls
Selected 
Treatments
Potential 
Controls  
Selected 
Controls
Ln farm sales 4.683 4.783 4.605 4.750 4.807 4.746
Ln on-farm labour 0.419 0.307 0.384 0.430 0.326 0.450
Ln off-farm labour 0.962 1.055 0.929 0.687 1.159 0.727
Ln area under cultivation 3.988 3.932 3.996 3.961 3.941 3.935
Ln share of grassland 3.051 2.920 2.906 2.835 2.304 2.857
Ln share of rented land 3.864 3.698 3.835 3.744 3.712 3.764
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.696 0.850 0.609 0.788 0.866 0.811
Ln farm capital (per ha) 2.433 2.349 2.457 2.524 2.415 2.495
Ln cattle livestock units 3.221 3.136 2.967 2.981 2.553 2.961
Ln cattle livestock density 0.517 0.545 0.455 0.507  0.474 0.488
Ln fertilizer expend. (per ha) -2.602 -2.436  -2.550 -2.634 2.405 2.638
Ln pesticide exp. (per ha) -2.793 -2.908 2.831 -2.831 2.585 2.830
Dummy North 0.073 0.413 0.069 0.013 0.372 0.015
Dummy West 0.098 0.493 0.099 0.243 0.330 0.208
Dummy South 0.814 0.081 0.820 0.735 0.284 0.768
Dummy East  0.015 0.013 0.012 0.009 0.137 0.009
  
Number of observations 8,682 7,195 8,682 456 13,075 456
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Bold numbers indicate significantly different 
means between observation from the potential (selected) treatment group and from the potential (selected) 
control group in a t-test for equality of means at the 5 % level. 
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Table A5(b): 
Results from 1:1 Matching with replacement (common support, 5 % trimming) 
 
 (b) Average treatment effect (ATT) of the treated for AE and LFA programs (2000 – 2005) 
 Treatments Controls ATT t-value 
 [1] [2] = [1] - [2] (Significance) 
Agri-Environmental Programs      
Ln farm sales      
Ln on-farm labour  
Ln off-farm labour  
Ln area under cultivation 
Ln share of grassland 
Ln share of rented land 
Ln farm sales (per ha) 
Ln farm capital (per ha)   
Ln cattle livestock units   
Ln cattle livestock density   
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha)  
No treatment effects have been 
calculated since matching did not 
eliminate differences in covariates 
between participants and non-
participants. 
 
 
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha)      
      
Less Favoured Area Program      
Ln farm sales 0.153 0.016 0.137 3.97 (***) 
Ln on-farm labour 0.006 -0.015 0.021 1.22  
Ln off-farm labour -0.008 0.004 -0.011 -1.67  
Ln area under cultivation 0.114 0.039 0.075 4.50 (***) 
Ln share of grassland -0.042 -0.068 0.026 0.91  
Ln share of rented land 0.042 0.002 0.040 1.18  
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.039 -0.023 0.063 1.88 (*) 
Ln farm capital (per ha) 0.004 0.020 -0.016 -0.42  
Ln cattle livestock units -0.104 -0.203 0.100 1.95 (**) 
Ln cattle livestock density -0.091 -0.093 0.001 0.04  
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 0.129 0.211 -0.082 -1.71 (*) 
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) -0.016 0.127 -0.143 -2.48 (***) 
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-
test for equality of means at 1 % (***), 5 % (**), or 10 % (*) level. ‘Common support’ indicates that those 
observations from the treatment group are eliminated, for which the propensity score is higher than the 
maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of controls. ‘5 %-trimming’ imposes common support 
by dropping 5 percent of the treatment observations at which the propensity score density of the control 
observations is the lowest (see Sianesi, 2001). 
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Table A6(a): 
Results from 1:5 Matching with replacement (common support, 5 % trimming) 
 
(a) Mean comparison of selected variables in year 2000 
 Agri-Environmental Programs Less Favoured Area Program 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables 
Selected
Treatments
Potential 
Controls 
Selected 
Controls
Selected 
Treatments 
Potential 
Controls  
Selected 
Controls
Ln farm sales 4.685 4.783 4.608 4.745 4.807 4.794
Ln on-farm labour 0.421 0.307 0.403 0.420 0.326 0.432
Ln off-farm labour 0.959 1.055 0.881 0.667 1.159 0.660
Ln area under cultivation 4.000 3.932 3.999 3.988 3.941 4.018
Ln share of grassland 3.060 2.920 2.880 2.922 2.304 2.908
Ln share of rented land 3.870 3.698 3.793 3.774 3.712 3.779
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.686 0.850 0.609 0.756  0.866 0.776
Ln farm capital (per ha) 2.421 2.349 2.483 2.475  2.415 2.449
Ln cattle livestock units 3.233 3.136 2.905 3.065 2.553 3.078
Ln cattle livestock density 0.510 0.545 0.466 0.510 0.474 0.482
Ln fertilizer expend. (per ha) -2.607 -2.436 -2.598 -2.675 2.405 2.687
Ln pesticide expend. (per ha) -2.797 -2.908 2.813 -2.913 2.585 2.945
Dummy North 0.071 0.413 0.066 0.012 0.372 0.015
Dummy West 0.095 0.493 0.100 0.253 0.330 0.257
Dummy South 0.818 0.081 0.821 0.727 0.284 0.722
Dummy East  0.016 0.013 0.014 0.008 0.137 0.006
   
Number of observations 8,978 7,195 8,978 501 13,075 501
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Bold numbers indicate significantly different 
means between observation from the potential (selected) treatment group and from the potential (selected) 
control group in a t-test for equality of means at the 5 % level. 
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Table A6(b): 
Results from 1:5 Matching with replacement (common support, 5 % trimming) 
 
 (b) Average treatment effect (ATT) of the treated for AE and LFA programs (2000 – 2005) 
 Treatments Controls ATT t-value 
 [1] [2] = [1] - [2] (Significance) 
Agri-Environmental Programs      
Ln farm sales      
Ln on-farm labour  
Ln off-farm labour  
Ln area under cultivation 
Ln share of grassland 
Ln share of rented land 
Ln farm sales (per ha) 
Ln farm capital (per ha)   
Ln cattle livestock units   
Ln cattle livestock density   
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha)  
No treatment effects have been 
calculated since matching did not 
eliminate differences in covariates 
between participants and non-
participants. 
 
 
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha)      
      
Less Favoured Area Program      
Ln farm sales 0.159 0.046 0.113 4.32 (***) 
Ln on-farm labour 0.012 0.004 0.008 0.49  
Ln off-farm labour -0.010 0.001 -0.011 -1.61  
Ln area under cultivation 0.115 0.053 0.062 4.93 (***) 
Ln share of grassland -0.040 -0.086 0.046 1.71 (*) 
Ln share of rented land 0.047 0.013 0.035 1.31  
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.045 -0.007 0.051 2.03 (*) 
Ln farm capital (per ha) 0.003 0.004 0.000 -0.02  
Ln cattle livestock units -0.100 -0.191 0.091 2.27 (**) 
Ln cattle livestock density -0.099 -0.080 -0.019 -0.67  
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 0.150 0.186 -0.037 -0.94  
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) 0.004 0.097 -0.093 -1.92 (**) 
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-
test for equality of means at 1 % (***), 5 % (**), or 10 % (*) level. ‘Common support’ indicates that those 
observations from the treatment group are eliminated, for which the propensity score is higher than the 
maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of controls. ‘5 %-trimming’ imposes common support 
by dropping 5 percent of the treatment observations at which the propensity score density of the control 
observations is the lowest (see Sianesi, 2001). 
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Table A7(a): 
Results from 1:1 Matching with replacement (Caliper 0.0001) 
 
(a) Mean comparison of selected variables in year 2000 
 Agri-Environmental Programs Less Favoured Area Program 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables 
Selected 
Treatments
Potential 
Controls 
Selected 
Controls
Selected 
Treatments 
Potential 
Controls  
Selected 
Controls
Ln farm sales 4.730 4.783 4.654 4.782 4.807 4.777
Ln on-farm labour 0.402 0.307 0.370 0.410 0.326 0.426
Ln off-farm labour 0.936 1.055 0.993 0.856 1.159 0.857
Ln area under cultivation 4.022 3.932 4.024 3.932 3.941 3.848
Ln share of grassland 3.052 2.920 2.880 2.648 2.304 2.581
Ln share of rented land 3.873 3.698 3.805 3.668 3.712 3.730
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.708 0.850 0.631 0.850 0.866 0.929
Ln farm capital (per ha) 2.380 2.349 2.424 2.584 2.415 2.550
Ln cattle livestock units 3.252 3.136 2.945 2.815 2.553 2.675
Ln cattle livestock density 0.518 0.545 0.455 0.519 0.474 0.523
Ln fertilizer expend. (per ha) -2.565 -2.436 2.561 -2.546 2.405 2.476
Ln pesticide expend. (per ha) -2.824 -2.908 2.845 -2.662 2.585 2.612
Dummy North 0.169 0.413 0.155 0.023 0.372 0.026
Dummy West 0.186 0.493 0.201 0.253 0.330 0.211
Dummy South 0.630 0.081 0.633 0.709 0.284 0.751
Dummy East  0.015 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.137 0.011
   
Number of observations 3,113 7,195 3,113 265 13,075 265
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Bold numbers indicate significantly different 
means between observation from the potential (selected) treatment group and from the potential (selected) 
control group in a t-test for equality of means at the 5 % level. 
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Table A7(b): 
Results from 1:1 Matching with replacement (Caliper 0.0001) 
 
 (b) Average treatment effect (ATT) of the treated for AE and LFA programs (2000 – 2005) 
 Treatments Controls ATT t-value 
 [1] [2] = [1] - [2] (Significance) 
Agri-Environmental Programs      
Ln farm sales      
Ln on-farm labour  
Ln off-farm labour  
Ln area under cultivation 
Ln share of grassland 
Ln share of rented land 
Ln farm sales (per ha) 
Ln farm capital (per ha) 
Ln cattle livestock units 
Ln cattle livestock density 
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) 
No treatment effects have been 
calculated since matching did not 
eliminate differences in covariates 
between participants and non-
participants. 
 
      
Less Favoured Area Program      
Ln farm sales 0.132 0.054 0.078 1.98 (**) 
Ln on-farm labour 0.019 -0.015 0.034 1.63  
Ln off-farm labour -0.013 0.004 -0.017 -1.58  
Ln area under cultivation 0.121 0.064 0.058 3.27 (***) 
Ln share of grassland -0.062 -0.077 0.016 0.44  
Ln share of rented land 0.069 0.027 0.043 1.05  
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.011 -0.010 0.020 0.52  
Ln farm capital (per ha) -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.01  
Ln cattle livestock units -0.084 -0.098 0.013 0.33  
Ln cattle livestock density -0.084 -0.098 0.013 0.33  
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 0.109 0.131 -0.022 -0.47  
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) -0.020 0.035 -0.054 -0.83  
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-
test for equality of means at 1 % (***), 5 % (**), or 10 % (*) level. ‘Caliper 0.0001’ indicates the value for 
maximum difference of the propensity score between treatments and controls (see Sianesi, 2001). 
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Table A8(a): 
(a) Results from 1:1 matching without replacement (Caliper 0.0001) 
 
(a): Mean comparison of selected variables in year 2000 
 Agri-Environmental Programs Less Favoured Area Program 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables 
Selected 
Treatments
Potential 
Controls 
Selected 
Controls
Selected 
Treatments 
Potential 
Controls  
Selected 
Controls
Ln farm sales 4.807 4.783 4.790 4.783 4.807 4.784
Ln on-farm labour 0.375 0.307 0.357 0.406 0.326 0.430
Ln off-farm labour 0.978 1.055 0.958 0.879 1.159 0.823
Ln area under cultivation 4.032 3.932 4.011 3.931 3.941 3.855
Ln share of grassland 3.010 2.920 2.979 2.632 2.304 2.624
Ln share of rented land 3.776 3.698 3.786 3.673 3.712 3.714
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.776 0.850 0.779 0.853 0.866 0.929
Ln farm capital (per ha) 2.321 2.349 2.3464 2.582 2.415 2.554
Ln cattle livestock units 3.217 3.136 3.154 2.830 2.553 2.746
Ln cattle livestock density 0.523 0.545 0.503 0.526 0.474 0.542
Ln fertilizer expend. (per ha) -2.480 -2.436 2.512 -2.549 2.405 2.480
Ln pesticide expend. (per ha) -2.903 -2.908 2.944 -2.650 2.585 -2.615
Dummy North 0.358 0.413 0.320 0.023 0.372 0.027
Dummy West 0.389 0.493 0.423 0.260 0.330 0.221
Dummy South 0.229 0.081 0.236 0.702 0.284 0.740
Dummy East  0.024 0.013 0.021 0.016  0.137 0.012
   
Number of observations 1,401 7,195 1,401 244 13,075 244
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Bold numbers indicate significantly different 
means between observation from the potential (selected) treatment group and from the potential (selected) 
control group in a t-test for equality of means at the 5 % level. 
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Table A8(b): 
(a) Results from 1:1 matching without replacement (Caliper 0.0001) 
 
 (b) Average treatment effect (ATT) of the treated for AE and LFA programs (2000 – 2005) 
 Treatments Controls ATT t-value 
 [1] [2] = [1] - [2]   
Agri-Environmental Programs      
Ln farm sales 0.082 0.062 0.020 1.47  
Ln on-farm labour 0.001 -0.013 0.015 1.33  
Ln off-farm labour -0.006 -0.000 -0.005 -1.06  
Ln area under cultivation 0.078 0.043 0.035 5.03 (***) 
Ln share of grassland -0.048 -0.102 0.054 2.74 (***) 
Ln share of rented land 0.018 -0.020 0.038 2.25 (**) 
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.004 0.018 -0.015 -1.10  
Ln farm capital (per ha) 0.048 0.036 0.012 0.73  
Ln cattle livestock units -0.195 -0.173 -0.022 -0.75  
Ln cattle livestock density -0.112 -0.055 -0.057 -2.97 (***) 
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 0.049 0.123 -0.074 -3.12 (***) 
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) -0.001 0.044 -0.045 -1.67 (*) 
      
Less Favoured Area Program      
Ln farm sales 0.130 0.048 0.082 2.13 (**) 
Ln on-farm labour 0.023 -0.024 0.046 2.25  
Ln off-farm labour -0.013 0.004 -0.017 -1.60  
Ln area under cultivation 0.120 0.064 0.056 3.22 (***) 
Ln share of grassland -0.059 -0.072 0.013 0.36  
Ln share of rented land 0.061 0.035 0.026 0.66  
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.010 -0.016 0.026 0.67  
Ln farm capital (per ha) -0.001 -0.008 0.006 0.14  
Ln cattle livestock units -0.105 -0.151 0.046 0.76  
Ln cattle livestock density -0.085 -0.105 0.020 0.50  
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 0.111 0.123 -0.012 -0.26  
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) -0.024 0.027 -0.051 -0.80  
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-
test for equality of means at 1 % (***), 5 % (**), or 10 % (*) level. ‘Caliper, 0.0001’ indicates the value for 
maximum difference of the propensity score between treatments and controls (see Sianesi, 2001). 
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Table A9(a): 
Results from Kernel Matching  
(Kernel type biweight, bandwidth 0.06 for AE programs and 0.005 for the LFA scheme) 
 
(a) Mean comparison of selected variables in year 2000 
 Agri-Environmental Programs Less Favoured Area Program 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables 
Selected 
Treatments
Potential 
Controls 
Selected 
Controls
Selected 
Treatments 
Potential 
Controls  
Selected 
Controls
Ln farm sales 4.687 4.783 4.584 4.744 4.807 4.788
Ln on-farm labour 0.425 0.307 0.383 0.420 0.326 0.433
Ln off-farm labour 0.958 1.055 1.012 0.666 1.159 0.725
Ln area under cultivation 4.015 3.932 3.949 3.988 3.941 4.029
Ln share of grassland 3.070 2.920 2.832 2.924 2.304 2.905
Ln share of rented land 3.879 3.698 3.750 3.774 3.712 3.795
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.672 0.850 0.635 0.756 0.866 0.759
Ln farm capital (per ha) 2.406 2.349 2.545 2.476 2.415 2.436
Ln cattle livestock units 3.237 3.136 2.837 3.068 2.553 3.072
Ln cattle livestock density 0.499 0.545 0.453 0.511 0.474 0.486
Ln fertilizer expend. (per ha) -2.623 -2.436 2.597 -2.676 2.405 2.702
Ln pesticide expend. (per ha) -2.803 -2.908 2.786 -2.913 2.585 2.959
Dummy North 0.070 0.413 0.064 0.012 0.372 0.065
Dummy West 0.094 0.493 0.099 0.253 0.330 0.252
Dummy South 0.821 0.081 0.823 0.727 0.284 0.675
Dummy East  0.016 0.013 0.014 0.008 0.137 0.008
   
Number of observations 9,135 7,195 9,135 502 13,075 502
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Bold numbers indicate significantly different 
means between observation from the potential (selected) treatment group and from the potential (selected) 
control group in a t-test for equality of means at the 5 % level. 
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Table A9(b): 
Results from Kernel Matching  
(Kernel type biweight, bandwidth 0.06 for AE programs and 0.005 for the LFA scheme) 
 
 (b) Average treatment effect (ATT) of the treated for AE and LFA programs (2000 – 2005) 
 Treatments Controls ATT t-value 
 [1] [2] = [1] - [2] (Significance) 
Agri-Environmental Programs      
Ln farm sales      
Ln on-farm labour  
Ln off-farm labour  
Ln area under cultivation 
Ln share of grassland 
Ln share of rented land 
Ln farm sales (per ha) 
Ln farm capital (per ha) 
Ln cattle livestock units 
Ln cattle livestock density 
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) 
No treatment effects have been 
calculated since matching did not 
eliminate differences in covariates 
between participants and non-
participants. 
 
      
Less Favoured Area Program      
Ln farm sales 0.159 0.055 0.104 3.94 (***) 
Ln on-farm labour 0.012 -0.001 0.013 0.74  
Ln off-farm labour -0.010 0.001 -0.011 -1.32  
Ln area under cultivation 0.115 0.046 0.068 5.54 (***) 
Ln share of grassland -0.040 -0.075 0.035 1.24  
Ln share of rented land 0.047 0.002 0.045 1.64  
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.045 0.009 0.036 1.41  
Ln farm capital (per ha) 0.004 0.007 -0.003 -0.09  
Ln cattle livestock units -0.100 -0.173 0.073 1.77 (*) 
Ln cattle livestock density -0.098 -0.065 -0.033 -1.20  
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 0.151 0.200 -0.050 -1.38  
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) 0.004 0.079 -0.076 -1.69  
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-
test for equality of means at 1 % (***), 5 % (**), or 10 % (*) level. ‘Kerneltype biweight’, specifies the 
biweight kernel function that determines the weight assigned to observations depending on the distance 
between treatment and controls. The biweight kernel gives the most weight to nearest control observations 
(see Sianesi, 2001). 
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Table A10(a): 
Results from Greedy Matching (cross-section estimation) 
 
(a) Mean comparison of selected variables (Frequencies for Dummy Variables) in year 2005 
 Agri-Environmental Programs Less Favoured Area Program 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables 
Selected 
Treatments
Potential 
Controls 
Selected 
Controls
Selected 
Treatments 
Potential 
Controls  
Selected 
Controls
Ln farm sales 4.854 4.823 4.824 4.886 4.858 4.839
Ln on-farm labour 0.372 0.298 0.351 0.428 0.323 0.453
Ln off-farm labour 1.154 1.224 1.147 0.715 1.157 0.740
Ln area under cultivation 4.129 3.976 4.081 4.070 3.995 4.031
Ln share of grassland 3.021 2.833 2.948 2.809 2.231 2.735
Ln share of rented land 3.796 3.684 3.779 3.788 3.706 3.760
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.725 0.847 0.743 0.817 0.863 0.808
Ln farm capital (per ha) 2.336 2.398 2.366 2.521 2.460 2.483
Ln cattle livestock units 3.060 2.939 3.040 2.894 2.333 2.779
Ln cattle livestock density 0.381 0.467 0.446 0.416 0.384 0.413
Ln fertilizer expend. (per ha) -2.460 -2.345 -2.385 -2.501 -2.280 -2.446
Ln pesticide expend. (per ha) -2.965 -2.911 -2.970 -2.865 -2.591 -2.771
Dummy North 593 2,970 541 6 4,865 5
Dummy West 711 3,549 751 108 4,313 108
Dummy South 451 581 463 334 3,718 337
Dummy East  52 95 52 4 179 2
   
Number of observations 1,807 7.195 1,807 452 13.075 452
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Bold numbers indicate significantly different 
means between observation from the potential (selected) treatment group and from the potential (selected) 
control group in a t-test for equality of means at the 5 % level. 
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Table A10(b): 
Results from Greedy Matching (cross-section estimation) 
 
 (b) Average treatment effect (ATT) of the treated for AE and LFA programs (2005) 
 Treatments Controls ATT t-value 
 [1] [2] = [1] - [2] (Significance) 
Agri-Environmental Programs      
Ln farm sales 4.854 4.824 0.030 1.06  
Ln on-farm labour 0.372 0.351 0.021 1.33  
Ln off-farm labour 1.154 1.147 0.007 0.08  
Ln area under cultivation 4.129 4.081 0.048 2.34 (**) 
Ln share of grassland 3.021 2.948 0.073 1.67 (*) 
Ln share of rented land 3.796 3.779 0.017 0.53  
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.725 0.743 -0.018 -0.73  
Ln farm capital (per ha) 2.336 2.366 -0.030 -1.14  
Ln cattle livestock units 3.060 3.04 0.020 0.32  
Ln cattle livestock density 0.381 0.446 -0.065 -3.40 (***) 
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) -2.460 -2.385 -0.075 -3.43 (***) 
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) -2.965 -2.970 0.005 0.12  
      
Less Favoured Area Program      
Ln farm sales 4.886 4.839 0.047 0.88  
Ln on-farm labour 0.428 0.453 -0.025 -0.83  
Ln off-farm labour 0.715 0.740 -0.025 -0.17  
Ln area under cultivation 4.070 4.031 0.039 0.99  
Ln share of grassland 2.809 2.735 0.074 0.75  
Ln share of rented land 3.788 3.760 0.028 0.43  
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.817 0.808 0.009 0.19  
Ln farm capital (per ha) 2.521 2.483 0.038 0.75  
Ln cattle livestock units 2.894 2.779 0.115 0.88  
Ln cattle livestock density 0.416 0.413 0.003 0.08  
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) -2.501 -2.446 -0.055 -1.39  
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) -2.865 -2.771 -0.094 -1.29  
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-
test for equality of means at 1 % (***), 5 % (**), or 10 % (*) level. The ATT in ‘cross-section estimation’ is 
computed as the mean difference of mean characteristics of treatment and controls in year 2005. 
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Table A11(a) 
Results from Greedy Matching applying an ‘naïve estimator’ 
(a) Mean comparison of selected variables (Frequencies for Dummy Variables) in year 2000 
 Agri-Environmental Programs Less Favoured Area Program
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable All Treatments All Controls All Treatments All Controls 
Ln farm sales 4.687 4.783 4.744 4.807
Ln on-farm labour 0.425 0.307 0.420 0.326
Ln off-farm labour 1.059 1.118 0.666 1.159
Ln area under cultivation 4.015 3.932 3.988 3.941
Ln share of grassland 3.070 2.920 2.924 2.304
Ln share of rented land 3.879 3.698 3.774 3.712
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.672 0.850 0.756 0.866
Ln farm capital (per ha) 2.406 2.349 2.476 2.414
Ln cattle livestock units 3.237 3.135 3.067 2.553
Ln cattle livestock density 0.499 0.545 0.511 0.474
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) -2.661 -2.443 -2.690 -2.409
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) -2.874 -2.952 -3.000 -2.617
Dummy North 634 2,970 6 4,865
Dummy West 856 3,549 127 4,313
Dummy South 7,505 581 365 3,718
Dummy East  143 95 4 179
  
Number of observations 9,138 7,195 502 13,075
 
 42
Table A11(b) 
Results from Greedy Matching applying an ‘naïve estimator’ 
 
(b) Average treatment effect (ATT) of the treated for the AE and LFA programs (2000 - 2005) 
 Treatments Controls ATT t-value 
 [1] [2] = [1] - [2] (Significance) 
Agri-Environmental Programs      
Ln farm sales 0.097 0.041 0.056 8.69 (***) 
Ln on-farm labour 0.004 -0.009 0.013 2.57 (*) 
Ln off-farm labour -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -1.06  
Ln area under cultivation 0.086 0.044 0.042 13.70 (***) 
Ln share of grassland -0.042 -0.087 0.045 5.78 (***) 
Ln share of rented land 0.025 -0.014 0.039 5.73 (***) 
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.011 -0.003 0.014 2.30 (**) 
Ln farm capital (per ha) -0.019 0.050 -0.069 -9.47 (***) 
Ln cattle livestock units -0.163 -0.197 0.034 2.87 (***) 
Ln cattle livestock density -0.112 -0.078 -0.034 -4.37 (***) 
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 0.118 0.091 0.027 2.98 (***) 
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) -0.048 0.026 -0.074 -6.73 (***) 
      
Less Favoured Area Program      
Ln farm sales 0.159 0.052 0.107 5.67 (***) 
Ln on-farm labour 0.012 -0.002 0.014 1.19  
Ln off-farm labour -0.010 -0.002 -0.008 -1.31  
Ln area under cultivation 0.115 0.055 0.060 6.46 (***) 
Ln share of grassland -0.040 -0.073 0.033 1.90 (*) 
Ln share of rented land 0.047 -0.006 0.053 2.67 (***) 
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.045 -0.003 0.048 2.61 (***) 
Ln farm capital (per ha) 0.004 0.045 -0.041 -1.84 (*) 
Ln cattle livestock units -0.100 -0.220 0.120 3.38 (***) 
Ln cattle livestock density -0.098 -0.090 -0.008 -0.39  
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 0.151 0.125 0.026 1.05  
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) 0.004 -0.006 0.010 0.32  
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Bold numbers indicate significantly different 
means between observation from the potential (selected) treatment group and from the potential (selected) 
control group in a t-test for equality of means at the 5 % level. Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-
test for equality of means at 1 % (***), 5 % (**), or 10 % (*) level. ‘Naïve estimator’ means that the 
difference-in-difference estimator was applied without control for pre-treatment characteristics in year 2000. 
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Table A12(a) 
Results from Greedy Matching (one year of participation) 
 
(a) Mean comparison of selected variables (Frequencies for Dummy Variables) in year 2000 
 Agri-Environmental Programs Less Favoured Area Program 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables 
Selected 
Treatments
Potential 
Controls 
Selected 
Controls
Selected 
Treatments 
Potential 
Controls  
Selected 
Controls
Ln farm sales 4.871 4.777 4.871 4.816 4.785 4.822
Ln on-farm labour 0.313 0.267 0.305 0.335 0.317 0.263
Ln off-farm labour 1.067 1.164 1.145 1.354 1.211 1.221
Ln area under cultivation 4.057 3.905 4.057 4.022 3.928 4.065
Ln share of grassland 2.829 2.946 2.808 2.360 2.307 2.507
Ln share of rented land 3.812 3.714 3.797 3.884 3.706 3.812
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.814 0.871 0.814 0.793 0.857 0.757
Ln farm capital (per ha) 2.314 2.329 2.308 2.424 2.420 2.412
Ln cattle livestock units 2.700 2.762 2.701 2.553 2.520 2.774
Ln cattle livestock density 0.460 0.484 0.458 0.473 0.459 0.451
Ln fertilizer expend. (per ha) -2.456 -2.433 -2.455 -2.527 -2.421 -2.491
Ln pesticide expend. (per ha) -2.728 -2.861 -2.751 -2.660 -2.622 -2.670
Dummy North 519 3,791 503 37 5,518 47
Dummy West 3 4,473 633 73 4,892 72
Dummy South 309 679 321 192 4,244 179
Dummy East  70 120 64 4 214 8
   
Number of observations 1,521 9,063 1,521 306 14,868 306
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Bold numbers indicate significantly different 
means between observation from the potential (selected) treatment group and from the potential (selected) 
control group in a t-test for equality of means at the 5% level. 
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Table A12(b) 
Results from Greedy Matching (one year of participation) 
 
(b) Average treatment effect (ATT) of the treated for the AE and LFA programs (2000 – 2005) 
 Treatments Controls ATT t-value 
 [1] [2] = [1] - [2] (Significance) 
Agri-Environmental Programs      
Ln farm sales 0.067 0.046 0.021 1.30  
Ln on-farm labour 0.015 0.016 -0.001 -0.12  
Ln off-farm labour -0.007 -0.005 -0.002 -0.37  
Ln area under cultivation 0.076 0.045 0.031 3.73 (***) 
Ln share of grassland -0.090 -0.059 -0.031 -1.50  
Ln share of rented land 0.006 -0.033 0.039 2.40 (**) 
Ln farm sales (per ha) -0.009 0.001 -0.010 -0.62  
Ln farm capital (per ha) 0.046 0.072 -0.026 -1.39  
Ln cattle livestock units -0.228 -0.153 -0.075 -2.68 (***) 
Ln cattle livestock density -0.103 -0.048 -0.055 -2.81 (***) 
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 0.104 0.125 -0.021 -0.91  
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) 0.007 -0.01 0.017 0.70  
      
Less Favoured Area Program      
Ln farm sales 0.086 0.089 -0.003 -0.10  
Ln on-farm labour 0.028 0.063 -0.035 -1.06  
Ln off-farm labour -0.011 0.000 -0.011 -0.82  
Ln area under cultivation 0.096 0.078 0.018 0.97  
Ln share of grassland -0.050 -0.124 0.074 1.71 (*) 
Ln share of rented land 0.024 0.029 -0.005 -0.17  
Ln farm sales (per ha) -0.009 0.011 -0.020 -0.71  
Ln farm capital (per ha) -0.051 -0.07 0.019 0.48  
Ln cattle livestock units -0.290 -0.209 -0.081 -1.20  
Ln cattle livestock density -0.196 -0.087 -0.109 -2.45 (**) 
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 0.114 0.065 0.049 0.94  
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) -0.016 -0.031 0.015 0.27  
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-
test for equality of means at 1 % (***), 5 % (**), or 10 % (*) level. 
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Table A13(a) 
Results from Greedy Matching (two years participation) 
 
(a) Mean comparison of selected variables (Frequencies for Dummy Variables) in year 2000 
 Agri-Environmental Programs Less Favoured Area Program 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables 
Selected 
Treatments
Potential 
Controls 
Selected 
Controls
Selected 
Treatments 
Potential 
Controls  
Selected 
Controls
Ln farm sales 4.804 4.769 4.798 4.658 4.798 4.751
Ln on-farm labour 0.360 0.288 0.344 0.332 0.325 0.385
Ln off-farm labour 1.129 1.116 0.963 1.221 1.220 1.232
Ln area under cultivation 4.002 3.929 3.992 3.989 3.933 3.949
Ln share of grassland 2.907 2.948 2.954 2.830 2.322 2.701
Ln share of rented land 3.780 3.725 3.762 3.820 3.708 3.839
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.802 0.841 0.806 0.669 0.863 0.801
Ln farm capital (per ha) 2.378 2.313 2.351 2.427 2.415 2.421
Ln cattle livestock units 3.140 3.149 3.168 2.905 2.560 2.607
Ln cattle livestock density 0.536 0.544 0.572 0.412 0.471 0.379
Ln fertilizer expend. (per ha) -2.500 -2.442 -2.482 -2.761 -2.421 -2.744
Ln pesticide expend. (per ha) -2.877 -2.985 -2.924 -2.805 -2.615 -2.82
Dummy North 198 3,360 193 22 5,281 19
Dummy West 358 3,827 368 37 4,651 34
Dummy South 250 582 246 122 3,948 127
Dummy East  31 109 30 2 191 3
   
Number of observations 837 7,878 837 183 14,071 183
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Bold numbers indicate significantly different 
means between observation from the potential (selected) treatment group and from the potential (selected) 
control group in a t-test for equality of means at the 5% level. 
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Table A13(b) 
Results from Greedy Matching (two years participation) 
 
(b) Average treatment effect (ATT) of the treated for the AE and LFA programs (2000 – 2005) 
 Treatments Controls ATT t-value 
 [1] [2] = [1] - [2] (Significance) 
Agri-Environmental Programs      
Ln farm sales 0.050 0.026 0.024 0.87  
Ln on-farm labour 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.10  
Ln off-farm labour 0.000 -0.003 0.003 0.53  
Ln area under cultivation 0.066 0.040 0.026 2.19 (**) 
Ln share of grassland -0.107 -0.159 0.052 1.83 (*) 
Ln share of rented land 0.012 -0.010 0.022 1.08  
Ln farm sales (per ha) -0.016 -0.013 -0.003 -0.10  
Ln farm capital (per ha) 0.046 0.041 0.005 0.20  
Ln cattle livestock units -0.255 -0.207 -0.048 -1.14  
Ln cattle livestock density -0.111 -0.074 -0.037 -1.29  
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 0.047 0.116 -0.069 -2.32 (**) 
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) -0.005 0.073 -0.078 -2.07 (**) 
      
Less Favoured Area Program      
Ln farm sales 0.059 0.032 0.027 0.47  
Ln on-farm labour -0.024 0.020 -0.044 -1.26  
Ln off-farm labour 0.008 0.003 0.005 0.79  
Ln area under cultivation 0.083 0.071 0.012 0.60  
Ln share of grassland -0.068 -0.058 -0.010 -0.21  
Ln share of rented land 0.047 0.006 0.041 0.80  
Ln farm sales (per ha) -0.024 -0.038 0.014 0.27  
Ln farm capital (per ha) -0.018 0.029 -0.047 -0.73  
Ln cattle livestock units -0.162 -0.154 -0.008 -0.11  
Ln cattle livestock density -0.079 -0.004 -0.075 -1.19  
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 0.165 0.243 -0.078 -1.05  
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) -0.096 -0.024 -0.072 -0.89  
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-
test for equality of means at 1 % (***), 5 % (**), or 10 % (*) level.  
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Table A14(a) 
Results from Greedy Matching (three years participation) 
 
(a) Mean comparison of selected variables (Frequencies for Dummy Variables) in the year 2000 
 Agri-Environmental Programs Less Favoured Area Program 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables 
Selected 
Treatments
Potential 
Controls 
Selected 
Controls
Selected 
Treatments 
Potential 
Controls  
Selected 
Controls
Ln farm sales 4.753 4.769 4.754 4.738 4.805 4.791
Ln on-farm labour 0.347 0.288 0.353 0.436 0.326 0.458
Ln off-farm labour 1.136 1.117 1.157 0.617 1.223 0.679
Ln area under cultivation 3.961 3.930 3.934 3.825 3.941 3.844
Ln share of grassland 2.982 2.949 2.993 2.934 2.304 2.815
Ln share of rented land 3.732 3.727 3.720 3.544 3.713 3.540
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.792 0.839 0.820 0.912 0.864 0.947
Ln farm capital (per ha) 2.443 2.310 2.424 2.704 2.411 2.637
Ln cattle livestock units 3.252 3.150 3.290 3.022 2.548 3.025
Ln cattle livestock density 0.573 0.543 0.576 0.578 0.470 0.556
Ln fertilizer expend. (per ha) -2.486 -2.443 -2.487 -2.640 -2.410 -2.627
Ln pesticide expend. (per ha) -2.908 -2.987 -2.951 -3.046 -2.617 -3.011
Dummy North 208 3,372 202 7 5,180 7
Dummy West 357 3,831 350 38 4,578 41
Dummy South 415 582 425 158 3,898 156
Dummy East  26 117 29 3 197 2
   
Number of observations 1,006 7,902 1,006 206 13,853 206
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Bold numbers indicate significantly different 
means between observation from the potential (selected) treatment group and from the potential (selected) 
control group in a t-test for equality of means at the 5% level. 
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Table A14(b) 
Results from Greedy Matching (three years participation) 
 
(b) Average treatment effect (ATT) of the treated for the AE and LFA programs (2000 – 2005) 
 Treatments Controls ATT t-value 
 [1] [2] = [1] - [2] (Significance) 
Agri-Environmental Programs      
Ln farm sales 0.022 0.036 -0.014 -0.60  
Ln on-farm labour 0.006 -0.008 0.014 0.85  
Ln off-farm labour -0.003 -0.006 0.003 0.51  
Ln area under cultivation 0.065 0.038 0.027 2.73 (***) 
Ln share of grassland -0.069 -0.116 0.047 2.01 (**) 
Ln share of rented land -0.016 -0.006 -0.010 -0.48  
Ln farm sales (per ha) -0.043 -0.003 -0.040 -1.86 (*) 
Ln farm capital (per ha) 0.017 0.050 -0.033 -1.67  
Ln cattle livestock units -0.227 -0.187 -0.040 -1.11  
Ln cattle livestock density -0.112 -0.059 -0.053 -2.37 (**) 
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 0.023 0.090 -0.067 -2.26 (**) 
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) -0.028 0.028 -0.056 -1.68 (*) 
      
Less Favoured Area Program      
Ln farm sales 0.093 0.073 0.020 0.45  
Ln on-farm labour -0.025 0.001 -0.026 -0.90  
Ln off-farm labour -0.002 -0.005 0.003 0.53  
Ln area under cultivation 0.109 0.078 0.031 1.29  
Ln share of grassland -0.036 -0.080 0.044 0.93  
Ln share of rented land 0.038 0.040 -0.002 -0.03  
Ln farm sales (per ha) -0.016 -0.004 -0.012 -0.28  
Ln farm capital (per ha) -0.009 -0.026 0.017 0.34  
Ln cattle livestock units -0.174 -0.173 -0.001 -0.01  
Ln cattle livestock density -0.136 -0.081 -0.055 -1.25  
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 0.113 0.143 -0.030 -0.54  
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) 0.030 0.091 -0.061 -0.80  
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-
test for equality of means at 1 % (***), 5 % (**), or 10 % (*) level.  
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Table A15(a) 
Results from Greedy Matching (four years participation) 
 
(a) Mean comparison of selected variables (Frequencies for Dummy Variables) in year 2000 
 Agri-Environmental Programs Less Favoured Area Program 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables 
Selected 
Treatments
Potential 
Controls 
Selected 
Controls
Selected 
Treatments 
Potential 
Controls  
Selected 
Controls
Ln farm sales 4.717 4.725 4.725 4.773 4.798 4.744
Ln on-farm labour 0.336 0.369 0.335 0.374 0.325 0.393
Ln off-farm labour 1.216 1.150 1.114 0.757 1.221 0.618
Ln area under cultivation 3.999 4.014 3.992 4.098 3.937 4.143
Ln share of grassland 2.975 2.962 3.010 2.761 2.324 2.601
Ln share of rented land 3.736 3.800 3.753 3.889 3.709 3.955
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.718 0.711 0.733 0.675 0.861 0.600
Ln farm capital (per ha) 2.366 2.309 2.376 2.316 2.412 2.317
Ln cattle livestock units 3.186 3.154 3.232 2.848 2.562 2.867
Ln cattle livestock density 0.502 0.544 0.518 0.387 0.471 0.426
Ln fertilizer expend. (per ha) -2.531 -2.442 -2.527 -2.635 -2.422 -2.605
Ln pesticide expend. (per ha) -2.962 -2.988 -2.990 -2.786 -2.617 -2.626
Dummy North 326 3,365 339 2 5,298 1
Dummy West 472 3,824 460 67 4,651 56
Dummy South 440 582 444 113 3,956 124
Dummy East  37 117 32 2 200 3
   
Number of observations 1,275 7,888 1,275 184 14,105 184
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Bold numbers indicate significantly different 
means between observation from the potential (selected) treatment group and from the potential (selected) 
control group in a t-test for equality of means at the 5% level. 
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Table A15(b) 
Results from Greedy Matching (four years participation) 
 
(b) Average treatment effect (ATT) of the treated for the AE and LFA programs (2000 – 2005) 
 Treatments Controls ATT t-value 
 [1] [2] = [1] - [2] (Significance) 
Agri-Environmental Programs      
Ln farm sales 0.022 0.021 0.001 0.05  
Ln on-farm labour 0.001 0.01 -0.009 0.59  
Ln off-farm labour 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.18  
Ln area under cultivation 0.074 0.033 0.041 4.80 (***) 
Ln share of grassland -0.022 -0.107 0.085 4.07 (***) 
Ln share of rented land 0.026 -0.013 0.039 2.16 (**) 
Ln farm sales (per ha) -0.052 -0.012 -0.040 -1.96 (**) 
Ln farm capital (per ha) -0.001 0.047 -0.048 -2.50 (**) 
Ln cattle livestock units -0.224 -0.208 -0.016 -0.51  
Ln cattle livestock density -0.151 -0.054 -0.097 -4.29 (***) 
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 0.037 0.113 -0.076 -2.75 (***) 
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) -0.046 0.001 -0.047 -1.58  
      
Less Favoured Area Program      
Ln farm sales 0.158 0.073 0.085 1.77 (*) 
Ln on-farm labour 0.031 -0.011 0.042 1.49  
Ln off-farm labour -0.027 0.002 -0.029 -1.83 (*) 
Ln area under cultivation 0.109 0.065 0.044 1.84 (*) 
Ln share of grassland -0.027 -0.105 0.078 1.70 (*) 
Ln share of rented land 0.017 -0.039 0.056 1.10  
Ln farm sales (per ha) 0.049 0.008 0.041 0.86  
Ln farm capital (per ha) 0.018 0.003 0.015 0.28  
Ln cattle livestock units -0.025 -0.267 0.242 3.38 (***) 
Ln cattle livestock density -0.032 -0.117 0.085 1.71 (*) 
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha) 0.184 0.183 0.001 0.02  
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha) -0.052 -0.017 -0.035 -0.51  
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviations see Table A1. Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-
test for equality of means at 1 % (***), 5 % (**), or 10 % (*) level.  
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FigureA1: 
Distribution of propensity scores (p(X)) of potential and selected treatment and controls in 
the AE and LFA programs 
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Figure A2: 
Nonparametric regression of the conditional participation probabilities (p(X)) on 
additional outcome variables for the AEP. 
 
 
Remarks: Nadaraya-Watson estimate using a Gaussian kernel and the rule-of-thumb bandwidth. The 
solid (dotted) line represents the outcome variable for participants (non-participants) in AE 
programs. Note that the plots of the densities suggest that there is no substantial problem of 
non-overlapping support. 
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Figure A3: 
Nonparametric regression of the conditional participation probabilities (p(X)) on outcome 
variables for the LFA program. 
 
Remarks: Nadaraya-Watson estimate using a Gaussian kernel and the rule-of-thumb bandwidth. The 
solid (dotted) line represents the outcome variable for participants (non-participants) in the 
LFA program. Note that the plots of the densities suggest that there is no substantial problem 
of non-overlapping support. 
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Figure A4 
Nonparametric regression of the average (ln) program payments (per ha, 2001 – 2005) on 
the ATT for the AE programs. 
 
Remarks: Nadaraya-Watson estimate using a Gaussian kernel and the rule-of-thumb bandwidth. Non-
participants receive no payment, thus no dotted line is shown here. The solid line represents 
the outcome variable for participants in AE programs and can be interpreted as the causal 
effect of the program. 
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Figure A5 
Nonparametric regression of the average (ln) program payments (per ha, 2001 – 2005) on 
the ATT for the LFA program. 
 
Remarks: Nadaraya-Watson estimate using a Gaussian kernel and the rule-of-thumb bandwidth. Non-
participants receive no payment, thus no dotted line is shown here. The solid line represents 
the outcome variable for participants in AE programs and can be interpreted as the causal 
effect of the program. 
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Figure A6 
Nonparametric regression of the average (ln) area under cultivation (2001 – 2005) on 
outcome variables for the AE program. 
 
Remarks: Nadaraya-Watson estimate using a Gaussian kernel and the rule-of-thumb bandwidth. The 
solid (dotted) line represents the outcome variable for participants (non-participants) in AE 
programs.  
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